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2. Spinoza’s Non-Humanist
Humanism
MICHAEL MACK
I N T R O D U C T I O N :  S P I N O Z A ,  L I T E R A T U R E  A N D 
T H E  H U M A N I T I E S  A N D  A R T S
This chapter continues the investigation into Spinoza’s contribution 
to fi elds outside philosophy, developing and extending the preceding 
discussion about the relevance of Spinoza’s work vis-à-vis a novel 
 understanding of the imagination.
Further developing Spinoza’s rationalist perspective on the imagina-
tion, I have recently delineated a new approach towards the ethical 
signifi cance and social impact of literature and the arts (Mack 2011). 
This chapter shows how Spinoza’s thought is helpful in formulating a 
nascent approach to the study of literature and the arts /  humanities in 
general. I attempt to place emphasis on the active rather than merely 
receptive aspect of the humanities and arts. Here it creatively re-reads 
Spinoza’s term conatus as the striving or, in other words, the unend-
ing attempt to act within and perceive the world in radically new 
life-enhancing ways. The humanities and arts have traditionally been 
associated with the imagination. The imagination, in turn, has often 
been separated from the work of reason. Spinoza was the fi rst philoso-
pher to break down the separation between reason and imagination as 
well as between mind and body.
In order to understand Spinoza’s philosophy of the conatus better, we 
must therefore attend to his novel approach to the mind–body problem. It 
will emerge from this discussion that bringing together literature, human-
ities and the arts with medicine, social sciences and science depends on 
Spinoza’s post-humanist humanism. Spinoza does not deny humanity 
and human rationality. His reason is, however, that of the conatus: the 
striving to create and preserve ever-new forms of life. Rationality here 
consists in recognising the subjectivity of each form of life.
LORD PRINT.indd   28 07/02/2012   10:16
Spinoza’s Non-Humanist Humanism 29
The fi rst section will discuss what I call the ethics of literature: lit-
erature makes us conscious of the subjective and fi ctive ways of living 
which govern our day-to-day activities. This rationalist work of making 
us conscious of real fi ctions also provides the impetus to change our 
mode of action and interaction within society at large. The second 
section analyses one powerful fi ction that has shaped various attempts 
to fi nd an abstract measure of what is human. This is the fi ction of bio-
politics, the extreme variation of which determined the Nazi genocide. 
The last section analyses the ways in which the Spinozist thinker Gilles 
Deleuze comes to terms with philosophical repercussions of biopolitics 
and totalitarianism. This discussion will show that a literary mode of 
inquiry may prove to be closer to the ethics of living than Deleuze’s 
ideational discourse. The radical wager proposed in this chapter is that 
literature, rather than philosophical discourse à la Deleuze, bridges the 
gap between the mental and the corporeal, between the humanities 
and the sciences. The bridging of these divides was a major concern of 
Spinoza’s re-conception of the mind as the idea of the body.
S P I N O Z A ’ S  C O N A T U S  A N D  T H E  N E W  A P P R O A C H 
T O  L I T E R A T U R E ,  H U M A N I T I E S  A N D  T H E  A R T S
There is a certain parallelism between imagination and reason, between 
mind and body. What has been taken to be the receptive region of both 
the body and the imagination turns out to be connected to the more 
active or constructive workings of the mind. In the latter half of the 
twentieth century, Spinoza’s radical revision of Descartes’s mind–body 
dualism was scientifi cally substantiated by neurological experiments 
and research fi ndings. By now it has become common neurological 
knowledge ‘that the human mind and spirituality originates in a physi-
cal organ, the brain’ (Kandel 2007: 9). Contemporary neurology has 
thus proved right Spinoza’s materialism of the mind (Damasio 2003). 
The mind is not separated from the body but partakes of it. The mind is 
itself corporeal matter (the brain). These neurological fi ndings overturn 
the traditional divide between body and mind which places the latter 
above the former. The predominance of Descartes’s res cogitans has 
begun to disintegrate. Descartes’s res cogitans ‘gives rise to rational 
thought and consciousness, and it refl ects in its nonphysical character 
the spiritual nature of the soul’ (Kandel 2007: 117).
Our contemporary culture is, to a large extent, shaped by the bio-
medical assumptions of a materialism which was fi rst advanced by 
Spinoza in his critique of Descartes’s mind–body divide (Mack 2010: 
11–29). Spinoza is, however, not a straightforward materialist, because 
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he combines a biomedical (avant la lettre) understanding of our human-
ity with an ethical perspective. Deleuze has analysed the ways in which 
ethics is different from morality. An ethical approach attempts to 
delineate ways of living, whereas a moral approach is concerned with 
conceptual issues or with representative models where questions of 
right and wrong are fi xed and mutually opposed to each other (Deleuze 
1988). Deleuze pinpoints the intellectual location of ethics within 
Spinoza’s parallelism of mind and body:
According to the Ethics, on the contrary, what is an action in the mind is 
necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is 
necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no primacy of one over the other. 
(Deleuze 1988: 18)
The ideational name for such understanding of ethics is what Deleuze 
calls ‘a philosophy of “life” in Spinoza; it consists precisely in denounc-
ing all that separates us from life, all these transcendent values that 
are turned against life, these values that are tied to the conditions and 
illusions of consciousness’ (Deleuze 1988: 26). In How Literature 
Changes the Way We Think, I have shown how Spinoza’s ethics solves 
the problem of a divide between art and life, which has characterised 
traditional approaches to aesthetics.
Spinoza tried to delineate ways of living from the perspective of an 
active and preservative principle which he called conatus. This principle 
equally informs the body and the mind, as it does the imagination and 
reason. The imagination is not passive or simply receptive (of images 
and other sense data); it also acts upon reason in either benefi cial or 
detrimental ways. Spinoza appreciates both desire and reason as being 
compelled by the conatus. In this way, ‘desire is the very essence of man, 
that is, a striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being’, and, 
in parallel, reason demands ‘that everyone should strive to preserve his 
own being as far as he can’ (E IVP18). Spinoza relates the imagination 
to desire, to the affects and to the body but also to morality, morality 
being determined by the concepts of good and evil. Spinoza submerges 
these concepts in a material or biological / corporeal realm. What we 
take to be morally good or evil varies according to what we desire, to 
what affects our body as either good or evil:
And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness 
which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself. But this 
idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body, 
that is, this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or from 
the idea of the body’s affection; it is only conceptually distinguished from 
it. There, this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself, 
insofar as we are conscious of it. (E IVP8)
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The concepts of good and evil denote cognition of what affects our 
bodies in either a benefi cial or detrimental manner. Up to this point, 
Spinoza anticipates our biomedical age of materialism. Spinoza is, 
however, concerned with the discovery of a way of life where we are 
collectively able to reduce the politico-social exposure of individuals 
and minorities to harm. At this point, Spinoza counters the partial or 
ideological-moral-aesthetic discussions of good and evil or beautiful 
and ugly. The problem with bodily affects and perceptions or desires 
is that they can mislead us; they can make us confuse our subjective 
disposition with objective or universal states of affairs. In this way, 
we take our predilections to be universal facts rather than subjective 
entities.
Here we reach the point where Spinoza’s thought critiques aspects of 
humanism. Out of our subjective notion of what is human we are prone 
to postulate an abstract and fi xed notion of humanity in general. This 
form of humanism is quite moralistic; it defi nes its notion of human-
ity in accordance with the concepts of good and evil. As we have seen 
above, Spinoza removes these terms from the exclusively mental realm 
of morality – the domain of traditional humanism – and submerges them 
into a more fl uid and less elevated element: that of biology, medicine 
and the corporeal. This is not say that he abandons reason, intellect and 
the spiritual. His rationalist approach is, however, quite idiosyncratic 
and marks a difference in the history of rationalism. It is a rationalism 
that is aware of its dependence on; as well as exposure to; the illusions 
and misapprehensions of bodily sensations and impressions.
Our corporeality connects us to the outside world via the senses of 
sight, touch and smell. The way we interpret various sense information 
is, however, culturally conditioned. The corporeal work performed by 
the senses, its neurons and the transmission of this information to the 
neurotransmitters located in the brain does not exist in a neutral loca-
tion. The work of how we interpret this information has to do with our 
culture and how we relate to it: whether we simply repeat or copy its 
interpretative framework or whether we differentiate ourselves from it. 
Medicine and biology cannot be separated from culture, and culture 
cannot be separated from the corporeal realm of medicine. As Sander 
L. Gilman has pointed out, ‘medicine is a part of general culture and 
the general culture is shaped by medicine’ (Gilman 2010: x). Spinoza’s 
thought has solved the problem of a purported split between medicine 
and the humanities (the realm of culture); he argues that the mind is the 
idea of the body and that we therefore live within a parallelism of the 
mental and the corporeal. We inhabit the osmosis of mind and body. 
This collapse of the boundary between mind and body has serious 
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implications for the validity of traditional humanism and, associated 
with it, rationalism and moral thought.
Signifi cantly, Spinoza insists on both ethics and the rationalism of 
his thought. His is rationalism with a difference, however. Reason 
here does not work out abstract categories that are imposed on our 
life. Rather than ruling nature and the corporeal in a one-way manner, 
reason here listens to the medical realm of the body. It is an intercon-
nection that refl ects upon delusions of generality – such as the fi xed 
notion of the human and, associated with it, the terms of good and 
evil – generated by the parallelism of mind and body which we inhabit.
Spinoza employs the term ‘reason’ for the opening-up of our perspec-
tive from our subjective lives to the larger, communal or universal map 
of our world: ‘Insofar as the mind reasons, it wants nothing other than 
to understand’ (E IVP26). The body, its affects and desire, are what 
the mind seeks to understand: ‘the object of our mind is the existing 
body and nothing else’ (E IIP13). In How Literature Changes the Way 
We Think, I have shown that literature does the work of Spinoza’s 
reason; in different and related ways it seeks to understand the increas-
ingly changing body of our world. Reason’s work of understanding 
operates on different levels which are interrelated and depend on the 
 imagination as one of its substantive parts.
S P I N O Z A ’ S  C R I T I Q U E  O F  H U M A N I S T I C 
A N T H R O P O C E N T R I C I S M ,  T H E  N A Z I  G E N O C I D E 
A N D  T H E  C O L L A P S E  O F  E T H I C S
This section analyses the ways in which Spinoza’s critique of purport-
edly objective views which are intrinsically subjective contribute to 
solving the problem of humanity’s centrality in our ecological structure, 
where – via industrial pollution and waste – the human has become a 
geological force (changing the ecosystem of the seas and the climate of 
our planet). In the following, we will fi rst establish the larger cultural 
context for an examination of the relevance of Spinoza’s thought to 
ecopolitical and medical problems through a discussion of the imagi-
nation and literature. The central argument focuses on an exploration 
of the problematic nature that characterises endeavours to defi ne or 
‘measure’ what it means to be human. This is all the more important 
in an age where the human has become an overweening and all-
dominating force in the non-human life of our planet. The biopolitical 
defi nition of humanity in terms of species existence depends on certain 
 conceptions of normativity and human essence.
Recent debates about the ‘post-human’ call these normative – or, 
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in other words, moral – conceptions into question (see, for example, 
Žižek 2006). Is there a human essence and why should there be one? 
Defi nitions of human essence have been established with the under-
standing of humanity’s centrality in the cosmos. Spinoza was the 
thinker who most explicitly and stringently analysed various humanistic 
and theological attempts to defi ne the human in terms of anthropomor-
phic conceptions of God. This and the following section (focusing on 
Deleuze and Nietzsche) discuss how Spinoza’s thought is of continuing 
relevance in an age that the Dutch chemist Paul Crutzen has described 
as anthropocene, as a new age ‘defi ned by one creature – man – who 
had become so dominant that he was capable of altering the planet on 
a geological scale’ (Kolbert 2005: 54). Through scientifi c-technological 
dominance, humanity is in the process of altering the conditions of life 
on Planet Earth. In our anthropocene age, humanity has thus become 
a geological force (see the discussion of Spinoza and ecology in the 
following chapter). Spinoza is helpful in a critique of the theological 
and scientifi c-historical ideas that prepared for such a predominance of 
humanity within the ecological system of our planet. As I have shown 
elsewhere (Mack 2010), he attempted to remove man from the centre 
of the philosophical, theological and scientifi c universe. He unmasked 
all grand human teleologies as theology that equates humanity with 
God / nature.
In this way, Spinoza is a non-humanist thinker. This does not mean 
that he is not concerned with the welfare of humanity. The following 
discussion explores how his critique of theology and normative strands 
of humanism may help us in a critique of current medical, theological 
and political attempts at reinforcing the anthropocene nature of what 
our planet has become. This analysis will shed light on how a norma-
tive conception of the human creates inhumane fi ctions of monolithic 
dominance and single-minded commercialism. One outcome of such 
developments is the anthropocene destruction of non-human life-
worlds within the eco-system of our planet. This shows that a norma-
tive conception of the human, which establishes abstract forms of what 
is normal, beautiful and good, does violence to the diversity of life (both 
within humanity and beyond). Normative conceptions of the human 
create fi ctions of truth, beauty and goodness, which can have inhumane 
consequences in the embodied world of both human society and the 
non-human life of our planet. A radically abstract and intransigently 
normative humanism can thus result in the collapse of the humanity 
which characterises traditional humanist ethics. The following will 
explore the ways in which Spinoza’s thought assists us in solving prob-
lems associated with the collapse of humanism: the absence of morality 
LORD PRINT.indd   33 07/02/2012   10:16
34 Spinoza Beyond Philosophy
that can be remedied via a Spinozan re-appreciation of ethics and lit-
erature. Hannah Arendt and Martha Nussbaum are important thinkers 
who have struggled with the collapse of traditional humanist ethics. 
What is missing in Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s respective analyses is a 
Spinozist perspective on how the collapse of humanism is already part 
of a humanist intransigence regarding abstract norms, which Spinoza 
has famously (or infamously) unmasked as fi ctions of power.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, humanism has lost some 
of its ethical validity. Partly as a response to disturbing biopolitical 
practices within the twentieth century (Nazism, Stalinism and other 
forms of totalitarianism), traditional conceptions of humanity have 
been questioned (see Arendt 2004 and 1994). This has been the case 
because, as Arendt has argued, various forms of totalitarian rule made 
use of certain humanistic traditions of ethics while perverting these 
traditions. In her Eichmann in Jerusalem she attempts to describe ‘the 
totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European 
society’ (Arendt 1991: 125). The Nazis corrupted Biblical, Socratic 
and Kantian ethics while proclaiming to be their true heir. Here the 
infl iction of harm, violence and mass death has become a duty. Acting 
unlawfully has become a law. Harmful acts have lost their traditional 
association with temptation. Instead harm, murder and robbery have 
transmogrifi ed into the new content of an otherwise seemingly intact 
morality of duty and obedience.
Arendt’s famous ‘banality of evil’ consists in the way cruelty has 
come to govern the normal way of social life. Eichmann and his fellow 
perpetrators were not abnormal or pathological. On the contrary, they 
represented normal and respectable German society. Evil has become 
normalised here; it has turned moral. Evil thus no longer denotes a 
temptation to break laws or a transgression of norms but the fulfi lment 
of the law and an accommodation to the social norm:
Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize 
it – the quality of temptation. Many Germans and many Nazis, probably 
an overwhelming majority of them, must have been tempted not to murder, 
not to rob, not to let their neighbors go off to their doom (for that the Jews 
were transported to their doom they knew, of course, even though many of 
them may not have known the gruesome details), and not to become accom-
plices in all these crimes by benefi ting from them. But, God knows, they had 
learned how to resist temptation. (Arendt 1991: 150)
While breaking with the content of traditional ethics (Socratic, 
Biblical or Kantian), Nazism continued and even reinforced notions 
of respectability and of what is acceptable or normal. In this way, 
Nazism’s corruption and distortion of traditional morality rein-
LORD PRINT.indd   34 07/02/2012   10:16
Spinoza’s Non-Humanist Humanism 35
forced, as well as magnifi ed, the normative dimension of traditional 
humanism. Indeed, the Nazis made it a duty to rob, deport and kill 
minorities (Jews, gypsies, people with a disability and homosexuals) 
by classifying them as abnormal, as carriers of infectious disease, 
and, worse still, as non-human and therefore not morally worthy 
to be alive. Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and people with a physical 
or mental disability were fi rst deprived of rights. This loss of rights 
prepared for the legality of their being put to death. Arendt analyses 
this political process, which declared certain groups of people to be 
outside the realm of the political and the publicly useful. The exclu-
sion from politics and the public good grows out of a normative or 
moralistic system which contrasts bare life, the mere fact of existence, 
with that of politics as the sphere of historical signifi cation and public 
achievement. Arendt critiques the politics of normative exclusion that 
led to the division of humanity and, in the case of the Nazi genocide, 
the radical exclusion of certain groups from the category of humanity. 
Arendt examines the perversion and collapse of traditional politics 
and morality (here confl ated with ethics). She attempts to understand 
this process of disintegration with a view to drawing consequences 
that could promote new beginnings for a non-exclusive approach 
towards politics and ethics in the post-war era. Arendt is especially 
concerned with the ways in which the re-enforcement of traditional 
practices of exclusion became the publicly valid form of ethical and 
political life under the Nazi regime.
In order to win public approval for its murderous norms, the Nazi 
propaganda machinery worked on the emotions of its audience. It 
provoked one emotion in particular: that of disgust. As Winfried 
Menninghaus has pointed out, ‘the fundamental schema of disgust is 
the experience of a nearness that is not wanted’ (Menninghaus 2003: 
1). Disgust seems to work in an immediate manner; what is perceived 
as disgusting has a direct way of permeating our skin and entering into 
the information-gathering mind – the brain. The experience of a near-
ness that is not wanted is, however, culturally conditioned. It is not 
something that comes naturally but depends on memory and learning. 
Emotions such as disgust are part of our psychological constitution and 
‘aspects of many psychological problems are learned’ (Kandel 2007: 
116). So, to identify a group or groups of people with the immediate 
feeling of disgust requires some training. Martha Nussbaum has shown 
how disgust ‘expresses a universal discomfort with bodily reality, but 
then uses this discomfort to target and subordinate vulnerable minori-
ties’ (Nussbaum 2010: XV). The identifi cation of the abject body with a 
word denoting a group of people is clearly a form of cultural training or 
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conditioning. This is what Nazi propaganda provided; it depicted Jews 
(and other minorities) in a way that made the word ‘Jew’ immediately 
identifi able with the feeling of disgust.
How is all of this relevant for today? Martha Nussbaum has 
recently shown how ‘the politics of disgust continues to exercise 
infl uence, often in more subtle and unstated ways’ (Nussbaum 2010: 
XIV). Whereas totalitarian societies are governed by a ‘politics of 
disgust’, in liberal democratic societies disgust has ‘gone under-
ground’ (Nussbaum 2010: XV). Being hidden does not necessarily 
prevent disgust from exerting its harmful and often lethal political 
consequences. To counter the open or hidden infl uence of a politics 
of disgust, Nussbaum makes a strong case for a politics of humanity. 
Whereas a politics of disgust denies the humanity of the other, the 
politics of humanity acknowledges our shared human condition. The 
former is exclusive and the latter is inclusive. How, however, can we 
cultivate inclusion? Nussbaum argues that we can become more inclu-
sive via the imagination: ‘Disgust imputes to the other a subhuman 
nature. How, by contrast, do we ever become able to see one another 
as human? Only via the imagination’ (Nussbaum 2010: XVII). Here 
Nussbaum’s contemporary critique meets with Arendt’s analysis of 
totalitarian terror. Both see the imagination as vital for ways of dimin-
ishing social exclusion, violence and genocide. Arendt makes a lack of 
imagination responsible for both Eichmann’s lack of feeling of guilt 
and his inability to repent:
It was precisely this lack of imagination which enabled him [i.e. Eichmann] 
to sit for months on end facing a German Jew who was conducting the 
police interrogation, pouring out his heart to the man and explaining again 
and again how it was that he reached only the rank of lieutenant colonel in 
the S.S. and that it had not been his fault that he was not promoted [. . .] 
He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness – something by no means 
identical with stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest 
criminals of that period. And if this is ‘banal’ and even funny, if with the best 
will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity 
from Eichmann, that is still far from calling it commonplace. (Arendt 1991: 
287–8)
As I have shown elsewhere (Mack 2009), Arendt does not understand 
by the word ‘thoughtless’ what it commonly means. Her usage of the 
term is uncommon in order to emphasise the non-communality of what 
the term describes. ‘Thoughtless’, in Arendt’s usage here, does not mean 
absent-minded or stupid or dysfunctional. It rather denotes what its 
linguistic isolation performs: the loss of communality and the denial of 
humanity’s interconnection. According to Arendt, Eichmann and his 
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fellow perpetrators enacted such loss of our communality by declaring 
certain groups of people to reside outside of what they fi xed in their 
racist nomenclature to be human.
Arendt assumes that such loss of communality goes hand in hand 
with the collapse of humanism. Spinoza, however, has already shown 
how such a collapse of humanism is potentially part of its normative 
intransigence that can do violence to the embodied world where we 
encounter a diversity of life forms that all strive to create and preserve 
their life (conatus). Arendt relates the imagination to understanding. 
Spinoza, as we have seen in the preceding section, and defi nes reason as 
the work of understanding corporeal reality. The reality reason seeks 
to grasp is in constant fl ux and hence cannot be accurately depicted via 
static concepts of duty and obedience. Eichmann and his fellow perpe-
trators refer to such static concepts – even to Kant’s categorical impera-
tive (in Eichmann’s case) – in order to move acts of mass murder into a 
detached or intellectual realm. The imposition of culturally determined 
standards of evil – the Jews, according to anti-Semitism, are ‘evil’ and 
thus evoke the bodily sensation of disgust – on to the universe of matter 
is what happened during the state-sponsored reign of Nazi terror on the 
European continent.
Spinoza critiqued the fi ctions that come to shape socio-political 
reality. The most brutal fi ction is the genocidal anti-Semitism which 
the Nazis enacted. Nazism thus brings to the fore the cultural or, in 
other words, subjective / fi ctive construction of the body; it fabricated 
the Jewish body as the non-human body. This harnessing of the term 
‘humanity’ in order to exclude groups of people from the human 
highlights the importance of our cultural engagement with deleterious 
fi ctions that determine the empirical core of the social sciences and 
the sciences. In this way, Spinoza’s analysis of humanist or moralistic 
thought about good and evil highlights the ways in which cultural 
inquiry – of which literature and the humanities partake – helps us 
tackle issues of violence, racism and other forms of stigmatisation in 
debates about and formulations of public policy. The Jews were cer-
tainly placeholders of evil for both Nazism and the quasi-scientifi c and 
quasi-theological racism that prepared its way (Mack 2003).
The following section analyses the predominance of a philosophical 
discourse that prioritises an abstract sphere of norms and ideas over 
and above the more fl uid realm that characterises the ethics of litera-
ture. This will be accomplished in an exploration of how the work of 
twentieth-century Spinozist Gilles Deleuze and that of the contempo-
rary philosopher Jacques Rancière comes to terms with the collapse of 
humanist morality after the Holocaust.
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D E L E U Z E ,  N I E T Z S C H E  A N D  T H E  T U R N  F R O M 
E T H I C S  T O  A E S T H E T I C S
On an ideational level, Deleuze takes seriously Spinoza’s critique of 
humanism and its concept-based morality of good and evil. He takes it 
so seriously that he decomposes the human body, which, in his thought, 
morphs into a body without organs. His work pivots around a refl ec-
tion about indistinction that does away with hierarchy, with various 
hierarchies which have informed the moral system of humanism and 
traditional theological thought. It is important to emphasise that 
Deleuze’s approach towards Spinoza’s non-hierarchical vision is purely 
philosophical; it concerns Spinoza’s philosophical term attributes. This 
is Deleuze’s post-humanist / idealist take on Spinoza:
Any hierarchy or pre-eminence is denied in so far as the substance is equally 
designated by all attributes in accordance with their essence, and equally 
expressed by all the modes in accordance with their degree of power. With 
Spinoza, univocal being ceases to be neutralized and becomes expressive; 
it becomes a truly expressive and affi rmative position. (Deleuze 2004: 50)
According to Deleuze, Spinoza has philosophically / ideationally done 
away with the differentiations and hierarchies which characterise tradi-
tional humanism and theology. Instead of hierarchical differentiations, 
we fi nd ourselves on an equal ideational playing fi eld where every 
philosophical attribute has a right to engage in forms of expression. My 
concern is with human equality. Deleuze’s philosophy does not bridge 
the divide which separates the ideational or mentalist world from the 
embodied sphere of human equality and public policy. My argument is 
that literature, rather than philosophical discourse à la Deleuze, bridges 
the gap between the mental and the corporeal, between the humanities 
and the sciences. The bridging of these divides was a major concern of 
Spinoza’s re-conception of the mind as the idea of the body.
Deleuze’s post-humanism has a decidedly idealist edge. His expres-
sionism does not relate to the distinct individual of traditional human-
ism. It rather refers to a series of expressions that are impersonal and 
ontological. This emphasis on the non-distinct results in Deleuze’s rejec-
tion of personalised representation in favour of impersonal repetition:
The world of representation presupposes a certain type of sedentary dis-
tribution, which divides or shares out that which is distributed in order to 
give ‘each’ their fi xed share (as in the bad game or the way to play, the pre-
existing rules defi ne distributive hypotheses according to which the results of 
the throws are partitioned). Representation essentially implies an analogy of 
being. However, the only realized Ontology – in other words, the univocity 
of being – is repetition. From Duns Scotus to Spinoza, the univocal position 
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has always rested on two fundamental theses. According to one, there are 
indeed forms of being, but contrary to what is suggested by the categories, 
these forms involve no division within being or plurality of ontological 
senses. According to the other, that of which being is said is repartitioned 
according to essentially mobile individuating differences which necessarily 
endow ‘each one’ with a plurality of modal signifi cations. This programme is 
expounded from the beginning of the Ethics: we are told that the attributes 
are irreducible to genera or categories because while they are formally dis-
tinct they all remain equal and ontologically one, and introduce no division 
into the substance which is said or expressed through them in a single and 
same sense (in other words, the real distinction between attributes is formal, 
not a numerical distinction). (Deleuze 2004: 377)
On the basis of Spinoza’s one-substance ontology, everything is more 
than interconnected or interrelated; it is univocally at one and all dis-
tinctions are simply formal rather than numerical. Deleuze’s philosophy 
takes issue with representation because representation presupposes dis-
tinct entities; representation constructs concepts that do not do justice 
to the world they claim to depict. Distinct entities cannot exist (in an 
absolute sense) in a univocal world. One of the most striking distinc-
tions is the one between good and evil, as has been discussed above. 
Whereas representation divides the world into spurious oppositions 
such as good and evil, the idea that, according to Deleuze, most accu-
rately accounts for the univocal constitution of life is that of repetition. 
The concept of representation is premised on a humanist understanding 
of our lives being fi xed in their proper place – proper according to the 
hierarchical coordinates of morality and theology. Deleuze’s repetition, 
by contrast, is mobile; repetitions are on the move. Deleuze’s repetitions 
enact infi nite series of repeating movements which are not identical but 
differ as they move. His approach to repetition is thus via difference 
and contrasted with representation. Representation works through 
categories and concepts; repetition operates through the movement of 
ideas.
Representations are fi ctions whereas repetitions instantiate the truth 
of ideas. In contrast to Spinoza’s, some aspects of Deleuze’s thought 
attempt to do away with the imagination, which he equates with rep-
resentation (fi ctions, non-truth) and which he contrasts with the truth 
of his ontological idea (repetition). Representation is the untruth of the 
imagination which violates the truth of the idea: repetition. Deleuze 
endeavours to propound a philosophy of difference. In order to do so, 
he distinguishes between repetition of the same (which is representa-
tion) and non-identical repetition. For non-identical repetition to work 
in a philosophy that attempts to combine Kantianism and Spinozism 
(Lord 2011: 130–54), the idea has to play a decisive role. Deleuze 
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 differentiates his understanding of the idea from the norms of tradi-
tional humanism, which does its work via representation rather than 
non-identical repetition. Identical repetition depends on a standard or a 
norm of which it would be representative.
Deleuze denies that this origin of the normative exists in reality. In 
truth, reality consists not of originals but of simulacra:
However, difference does not lie between things and simulacra, models and 
copies. Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, 
and the diffi culty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum, to 
attain the status of a sign in the coherence of the eternal return. (Deleuze 
2004: 81)
Deleuze here combines Nietzsche with Spinoza and Kant. He affi rms 
the primacy of the idea (idealism) by equating the idea with the reality 
of the senses (Spinoza’s univocity), and then reads the product of this 
equation in terms of Nietzsche’s eternal return. Nietzsche, as Alexander 
Nehemas’s Life as Literature has shown, is concerned with turning life 
into literature. Deleuze’s Nietzschean background is crucial for both his 
approach to Spinoza and his ideational reading of literature. Nietzsche’s 
eternal return may well be a response to Spinoza but is one that diverges 
from and warps Spinoza’s questioning of anthropomorphism. Spinoza 
argues that we should not confl ate our idea of God or nature with God 
or nature. This confl ation results from the mind’s uncritical acceptance 
of information the brain receives from bodily sensations.
This confused knowledge is what characterises the imagination. In 
this sense, we imagine the sun to be in close proximity to us, because 
our senses are strongly affected by the rays of the sun. The mind, by 
representing bodily affects, sees the sun to be in the vicinity of the 
earth. This representation does not yield knowledge of the truth but, 
as Galileo showed, turns out to be a fi ction: ‘For we imagine the sun 
so near not because we do not know its true distance, but because an 
affection of body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body 
is affected by the sun’ (E IIP35). Spinoza does not berate us for our 
inadequacy; inadequacy here describes our proneness to believe rep-
resentations or fi ctions to be true. On the contrary, he understands 
our representational dilemmas, writing that we ‘can hardly avoid this, 
because [we] are continually affected by external bodies’ (E IIP47). The 
point here is that we need to be aware that our knowledge derives from 
bodily inputs and represents our sense of being affected by external 
bodies. This awareness characterises reason; it is the mind’s mindful-
ness. Reason is the mind’s mindfulness of its embodiment and, conse-
quently, its imaginative tendencies. It puts our place in the universe in 
LORD PRINT.indd   40 07/02/2012   10:16
Spinoza’s Non-Humanist Humanism 41
perspective. The cosmos is no longer anthropocentric and we are no 
longer its centre. Spinoza set out to make us love God or nature intel-
lectually: to make us see how we are a small but signifi cant part of the 
vast and, to us, in its totality, incomprehensible universe.
Nietzsche is not so much concerned with Spinoza’s ethical and social 
thought as with the epistemological implications of a Spinozist critique 
of goal and God. What are the repercussions for our understanding 
of our cognitive powers, if we are only a small part of an infi nite and 
impersonal universe which Spinoza calls Deus sive natura? Modern 
science operates on the basis of the ceaselessly renewed testability 
and thus falsifi ability and re-visibility of its fi ndings. In this sense, it 
has incorporated Galileo’s and Spinoza’s demotion of the earth and 
humanity as the centre of the universe and all this implies for human 
omniscience. On the other hand, our age is an anthropocene age and it 
is one that has been shaped by scientifi c discoveries for which Galileo 
and Spinoza have prepared the intellectual ground. How can we 
explain this discrepancy?
The welding together of our planet with the industrial waste of 
humanity (plastic in the sea and so forth) has to do not so much with 
the practice of science as with the ecological consequences of an ever-
growing market economy based on consumption. Slavoj Žižek has 
famously called Deleuze ‘the ideologist of late capitalism’ (Žižek 2003: 
184). Deleuze’s Nietzschean idea of the eternal return fi nds a strik-
ing equivalent in the material sphere of infi nite serialised production. 
Branding depends on the repetition, not of the same, but of the slightly 
different (in this way, the advertising industry reinvents branded prod-
ucts within a repetitive or serialised framework where the same forms 
become repeated in infi nite variations). The basis of brand attachment 
is an affi rmation of our worth and value which we attach to the brand 
and which we hope to see eternally retuned to us with each purchase 
of the product. The point of Nietzsche’s eternal returns is, indeed, 
the immanent affi rmation of humanity’s fate – amor fati – in the face 
of a deserted transcendent realm which traditionally provided such 
 affi rmation from above.
Nietzsche doubts whether we can be satisfi ed with Spinoza’s, 
Galileo’s and Darwin’s demotion of our cognitive status from image 
of God to embodied part of the natural world. This may explain why 
he introduced the notion of the eternal return: to confi rm rather than 
to question humanity’s grandeur. As Nehemas has shown, Nietzsche 
equates life with literature. Such conception of life as repetition of lit-
erature – and vice versa, of literature as representation of life – is quite 
problematic. In Nietzsche’s case, diffi culties are compounded by the 
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fact that a traditional understanding of literature as harmonious, coher-
ent and whole underlies his concept of the eternal return. Nehemas has 
critiqued the internal coherence of Nietzsche’s equation of literature 
and life as follows:
And once we admit contents, we admit confl icts. What we think, want, 
and do is seldom if ever a coherent collection. Our thoughts contradict one 
another and contrast with our desires, which are themselves inconsistent 
and are in turn belied by our actions. The unity of the self, which Nietzsche 
identifi es with this collection, is thus seriously undermined. (Nehemas 1985: 
180)
Nietzsche’s reading of life as literature is itself a fi ction.
Whereas Spinoza critiques the fi ctitiousness that shapes aspects of our 
lives, Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ encourages us to celebrate our lives as 
fi ctions: as stylised harmonisations or even deifi cations of our human-
ity. The point of Spinoza’s critique of revelation is precisely to question 
this equation of life with an idealised concept of nature or God. So 
we can now come to see how Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s eternal 
return fi ts into his attempt to submerge Spinoza’s mind–body parallel-
ism in Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. This combination eventuates 
in Nietzsche’s eternal return, where we affi rm what is and what has 
been and eagerly await its repetition with different internal constitu-
tions. The primacy of Deleuze’s idea of repetition sacrifi ces Spinoza’s 
embodiment as ground of mental information to the Heideggerian 
thrownness (Geworfenheit) of the groundless as it separates memory 
from ideas. Deleuze’s repetition does its work within a philosophical 
system ‘where the ground was abolished in groundlessness, the Ideas 
were separated from the forms of memory, and the displacement and 
disguise of repetition engaged divergence and decentring, the powers of 
difference’ (Deleuze 2004: 364). The separation of memory from the 
idea which is repetition brings to the fore a certain lack of remembrance 
which enables the serialised differences of Deleuze’s philosophical 
system. His is a repetition out of amnesia:
one repeats because one does not know, because one does not remember, 
etc: or because one is not capable of performing the action (whether this 
action remains to be performed or is already performed). ‘One’ therefore 
signifi es here the unconscious of the Id as the fi rst power of repetition. 
(Deleuze 2004: 368)
The driving force behind difference is the Freudian dialectic of disa-
vowal or repression – the repression of a memory – and repetition. 
Deleuze discusses Freud with specifi c reference to the role of repetition 
and difference in the death drive:
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The turning point of Freudianism appears in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
the death instinct is discovered, not in connection with the destructive 
tendencies, not in connection with aggressivity, but as a result of a direct 
consideration of repetition phenomena. (Deleuze 2004: 18)
By ‘death drive’, Freud does not understand the state of being dead but 
the wish to be so. This wish for the restfulness associated with death 
is part of Freud’s pleasure principle, which drives us to repeat actions 
in different contexts and times that bring about states of rest and cer-
tainty. According to Žižek’s recent interpretation, Freud’s term denotes 
the uncanny persistence, not of death, but of life:
The paradox of the Freudian death drive is therefore that it is Freud’s name 
for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears within psychoanaly-
sis, for an uncanny excess of life, for an ‘undead’ urge that persists beyond 
the (biological) cycle of life and death, of generation and corruption. (Žižek 
2006: 245)
Emotions are highly ambivalent and the desire to be dead is no excep-
tion, for what drives such desire is the fearful wish not ever to reach the 
object of desire: death.
On an ontogenetic as well as a polygenetic level, we keep repeating 
certain forms of action through which we attempt to increase our sense 
of certainty, rest, respect and security, which makes us feel at home in 
the world. Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum derives from Freud’s 
understanding of fantasy which determines our psychology (not only 
the death drive but also the Oedipus complex):
A decisive moment in psychoanalysis occurred when Freud gave up, in 
certain respects, the hypothesis of real childhood events, which would have 
played the part of ultimate disguised terms, in order to substitute the power 
of fantasy which is immersed in the death instinct, where everything is 
already masked and disguised. In short, repetition is in its essence symbolic; 
symbols or simulacra are the letter of repetition itself. (Deleuze 2004: 19)
Here we reach the point where Nietzsche’s notion of life as literature 
comes fully to inform Deleuze’s idea of repetition.
What is repeated in ever-different shapes and forms is not the memory 
of something that actually took place but a certain kind of fi ction: in 
short, an imagined storyline or literature (the Oedipus complex or 
the primeval scene where the sons kill the alpha-male father fi gure). 
This is why literature, theatre and cinema play such an important 
role in Deleuze’s work. Through Nietzsche’s fascination with tragedy, 
Aristotle’s Poetics shapes Deleuze’s notion of the non-identical action of 
repetition that informs the world of theatre: ‘play it and repeat it until 
the acute moment that Aristotle called “recognition”’ (Deleuze 2004: 
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17). By repeating the actions in a different context, we come to realise 
their signifi cation and recognise their psychic meaning. This is Freud’s 
approach to repetition and Deleuze describes it as follows: ‘If repetition 
makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also frees us, 
testifying in both cases to its “demonic” power. All cure is a voyage to 
the bottom of repetition’ (Deleuze 2004: 21). Deleuze does not, however, 
describe the ways in which such repetition of fantasy may free us.
According to Freud, the awareness of what we are repeating frees 
us from future repetitions. In this way, the re-enactment of the primal 
scene in Moses and Monotheism – where the Jews repeat the fantasy 
of the primal scene by killing their father fi gure, Moses (which is, 
of course, itself a fantasy) – frees the Jews from future repetition of 
such violence in different social, historical and political contexts. This 
moment of the breakaway from repetition is missing in Deleuze’s philo-
sophical system, because it is founded on the idea of repetition and thus 
cannot free itself from it. Instead, his philosophy relies on an infi nite 
series of non-identical repetitions of simulacra which, as we have seen, 
are fantasies, storylines: in short, literature. Deleuze has banished one of 
form of imagination – the concept of representation – from the truth of 
his idea of repetition. Yet, as we have seen, the substance of repetition is 
itself imaginative: simulacra, fantasy, art and literature. In Nietzsche’s 
fashion, life turns out to be literature. This is where Deleuze diverges 
from Spinoza’s account of the imagination. Spinoza does not attempt to 
exclude the imagination from our lives, because this would be an impos-
sible undertaking (given that we do not live an affect-less, disembodied 
sphere). He does, however, admonish us to be mindful of our mind’s 
exposure to the misleading input of bodily sensations which gives rise 
to fi ctions of grandeur or fantasies of destruction. This mindfulness 
constitutes his ethics. Rather than abstract and superimposed concepts 
of good and evil, Spinoza’s ethics of mindfulness is context-specifi c 
and requires ever-renewed awareness, as well as alertness in particular 
situations which vary according to a given time and space. Spinoza’s 
ethics admonishes us to see our self-interest as bound up with that of 
others. Fantasies of one’s superiority over others are harmful to the self, 
because the self relies on the communal in the same way in which the 
communal depends on the self. This mutual dependence is part of our 
embodied constitution, which is one of disease, neediness and mortality. 
In order to avoid harm and to alleviate the prospect of illness and death, 
we have to be mindful of re-enacting certain fantasies of immortality, 
predominance and auto-immunity. Whereas Deleuze’s philosophy cele-
brates the repetition of various simulacra, Spinoza’s (as well as Freud’s) 
ethics attempts to break the circle of this and similar repetitions.
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While Deleuze engages with Spinoza’s critique of concepts (repre-
sentation) as fi ction, Deleuze himself clings to a fi ction (repetition of 
simulacra) which he, in Nietzschean fashion, attempts to equate with 
everyday life: ‘For there is no other aesthetic problem than that of the 
insertion of art into everyday life’ (Deleuze 2004: 365). Developing 
and radicalising Deleuze, Rancière has recently described this as the 
aesthetic turn, which he distinguishes from the ethical turn that char-
acterises the work of Derrida (Rancière 2010: 45–61). Rancière evokes 
Deleuze’s Heideggerian notion of ‘groundlessness’ (Deleuze 2004: 364) 
when he attempts to do away with the ground of ethics in Spinoza’s and 
Derrida’s work. As I have shown elsewhere (Mack 2010), in different 
ways, the ground of ethics in Spinoza’s and Derrida’s thought is that 
of self and other. In contrast to Derrida, Spinoza focuses on the pres-
ervation of selfhoods (conatus) and it is this preservation that depends 
on that of others. Derrida’s ethics criticises the political prioritisation 
of the self over and above the other. In Rancière’s aesthetic turn, we 
have lost all forms of differentiation between self and other, because 
 otherness is the principle of democratic politics:
Derrida argues that [. . .] democracy still holds fast to the same unexamined 
power of the autos or self. In a word, democracy lacks its Other, which can 
only come to it from the outside. Derrida thus set out to break with the 
circle of the self by weaving a thread from the pure receptivity of the khora 
to the other, or the newcomer, whose inclusion defi nes the horizon of a 
‘democracy to come’. My objection to this is very simple: otherness does not 
come to politics from the outside, for the reason that it already has its own 
 otherness, its own principle of heterogeneity. (Rancière 2010: 53)
That democracy has its own principle of heterogeneity is true within 
an ideational context (à la Deleuze) but the actual politics of it may be 
quite different from its idea. Literature focuses on the ethical negotiation 
between ideas and the messiness of their performance in the embodied 
and thus affect-ridden context that shapes our actual lives. Rather than 
repeating various ideas (that of Rancière’s groundless form of demo-
cratic equality or Deleuze’s repetition of simulacra), literature and art 
change the way we think about the potentiality of ideas and the particu-
lar context in which various ideas or scientifi c discoveries are applied 
and played out. Here I have begun to delineate an alternative account of 
the imagination out of Spinoza’s critique of representation. By focusing 
on the idea and by confl ating the work of the imagination with that of 
representation, Deleuze perpetuates a mimetic account of literature from 
his perspective of philosophy. What I call the ethics of literature estab-
lishes the radical difference of creativity, which is not so much ideational 
but performative – in short, yet another shift of Spinoza’s conatus.
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